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Two node variables determine the evolution of cascades in random networks: a node’s degree and
threshold. Correlations between both fundamentally change the robustness of a network, yet, they
are disregarded in standard analytic methods as local tree or heterogeneous mean field approxima-
tions because of the bad tractability of order statistics. We show how they become tractable in the
thermodynamic limit of infinite network size. This enables the analytic description of node attacks
that are characterized by threshold allocations based on node degree. Using two examples, we dis-
cuss possible implications of irregular phase transitions and different speeds of cascade evolution for
the control of cascades.
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k, 89.65.-s, 02.50.-r
How robust is a complex network against attacks, for
instance the targeted or random removal of nodes or
links? This is of fundamental interest for network sci-
ence [1–3] and tightly linked to the study of binary state
dynamics in Physics, for instance, in form of percola-
tion models [4], the zero-temperature random field Ising
model [5], fiber bundle models [6], or models of epidemic
spreading [7]. Similar approaches also describe phenom-
ena diverse as opinion formation [8, 9], financial systemic
risk [10–13], black-out cascades in power grids [14], and
the resilience of food webs in ecology [2, 15].
Most of these models can be mapped to a set-up
[16, 17] where the binary state si ∈ {0, 1} of a node
i ∈ V is determined by two variables: its load λi, which
indicates the fragility of the node, and its threshold θi,
which indicates its robustness. A node fails (si = 1)
whenever its load exceeds its threshold, θi ≥ λi(t). The
load λi(t) can change over time, measured in discrete
time steps t = 0, . . . , T , dependent on the interaction be-
tween nodes. For example, in case of a failure cascade,
the load of failing nodes can be redistributed to neigh-
boring nodes.
Consequently, one way to prevent such failure cascades
is to allocate specific thresholds to nodes. While, in gen-
eral, this allocation of thresholds could be dynamic, in
this letter, we focus on quenched networks where the
thresholds and the network topology stay constant over
time. The (fixed) degree of a node is defined by the num-
ber of its neighbors, i.e. by the links specified in the link
set E of a network. In the following, we concentrate on al-
location schemes where thresholds and node degrees are
correlated. Such correlations are empirically grounded,
e.g. well connected banks have the tendency of lower
equity than less connected banks [10, 18], even though
the opposite is expected to lead to more robust systems
[19, 20]. Some models already assume that a threshold
depends explicitly on the node degree [17, 21, 22] or on
degree-related centrality measures. Yet, it is important
to note that, dependent on the specific network, attack
strategies based on centrality measures can be more ef-
fective than attacks based on node degrees [23].
In the following, we consider random graphs with pre-
scribed degree distribution p(k) [24, 25]. This has the
advantage that ensemble averages of interesting quanti-
ties can be derived by analytic iterative approaches, so
called local tree approximations or heterogeneous mean
field approximations. They become exact in the thermo-
dynamic limit of infinite network size N →∞ (where N
is the number of nodes in the network). These approx-
imations have been extended to capture degree-degree
correlations p(k, d). Yet, surprisingly, the equally funda-
mental correlations between degrees and thresholds have
not been studied analytically. Only one specific case,
i.e. the removal of nodes with higher degrees, has been
studied for percolation [26, 27]. Other investigations of
deterministic attacks so far rely on simulations [19, 22],
because ranking of nodes leads to order statistics that are
difficult to capture analytically. In this letter, we show
that for infinitely large networks the ranks simplify sig-
nificantly and we can identify them by a transformation
of the respective cumulative distribution function (cdf).
Let’s assume that N degrees are drawn independently
from a degree distribution p(k) with cdf F (k). We order
them so that k1/N ≤ k2/N ≤ . . . ≤ kN/N . Correspond-
ingly, N thresholds are drawn independently from an ar-
bitrary threshold distribution with cdf Φ(θ) and ordered
θ1/N ≤ θ2/N ≤ . . . ≤ θN/N . Each node in the network
receives exactly one degree and one threshold. A specific
attack strategy a defines this assignment. It thus de-
cides which nodes are prone to failure because of a small
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2threshold. Formally, a is a bijective (Borel-measurable)
function a : [0, 1] → [0, 1] that assigns each degree rank
i/N a threshold rank a(i/N). Thus, a node has degree
ki/N and threshold θa(i/N). While a be non-linear in gen-
eral, the two most common heuristic attack strategies
correspond to linear a. In case of the identity a(x) = x,
thresholds and degrees are perfectly positively correlated.
Nodes with higher degree receive higher thresholds and
are less prone to failure, while peripheral nodes with
small degree are conjectured to fail. We call this attack
strategy the peripheral failures (pf) scheme. The choice
a(x) = 1 − x, on the other hand, means that degrees
and thresholds are perfectly anti-correlated. Nodes with
higher degrees receive lower thresholds and therefore are
more prone to fail. Hence, this attack strategy is focused
on hubs and we refer to it as the central failures (cf)
scheme.
y
FIG. 1. Illustration of the threshold assignment for central
failures. The interval ]F (k − 1), F (k)] (in cyan color) repre-
sents (the fraction of) all nodes with degree k in the network,
while the blue interval corresponds to nodes with threshold
θ ≤ x. Their intersection, the purple interval, can thus be
associated with all nodes in the network which have degree k
and a threshold smaller than or equal to x.
As i/N counts the fraction of nodes in the network
with degree k ≤ ki/N , it coincides with the value of the
empirical cdf i/N = F emp(ki/N ). Thus, for N → ∞,
a rank i/N converges to a value of the theoretical cdf
F (x) (i/N → F (x)) and, correspondingly, its threshold
rank to a(F (x)), which belongs to a threshold θ with
a(F (x)) = Φ(θ). Hence, for F (x) ∈]F (k − 1), F (k)],
a node equipped with the rank F (x) has degree k and
threshold Φ−1 (a(F (x))), where Φ−1 denotes the gener-
alized inverse or quantile function of Φ. Accordingly, we
can express the threshold cdf FΘ(k) (x) of a node condi-
tional on its degree k as
FΘ(k) (x) =
Φ|Φ−1(a(]F (k−1),F (k)]))
p(k)
, (1)
where Φ|M denotes the restriction of Φ to a set M, i.e.
Φ|M(x) = Φ(x) for x ∈ M and Φ|M(x) = 0 for x /∈ M.
The initial threshold cdf Φ is restricted to thresholds
that belong to nodes that we can identify with the in-
terval ]F (k−1), F (k)], i.e., the nodes with degree k. It is
renormalized by p(k), the probability mass of the respec-
tive set of nodes. Based on this consideration, we can
also compute the Spearman rank correlation coefficient
between thresholds and degrees as
rs =
√
12
∫ 1
0
(x− 1/2) (a(x)− a¯) dx√∫ 1
0
(a(x)− a¯)2 dx
, (2)
where a¯ =
∫ 1
0
a(x) dx is defined as average of a with
respect to a uniform distribution. As we would expect,
rs = 1 for peripheral failures and rs = −1 for central
failures. Also the derivation of the conditional threshold
distributions FΘ(k) (x) becomes more intuitive for these
two extreme cases.
In Figs. 1 and 2, all nodes of an infinitely large network
are mapped to the interval [0, 1], where their position is
defined by the degree cdf F . Thus, all nodes with degree
k can be associated with the interval ]F (k − 1), F (k)]
(cyan color in Figs. 1 and 2). This way, we do not
depict nodes, but fractions of nodes in the network or
their probability mass when randomly sampling from
all nodes in the network. Analogously, the bottom in-
terval (in Fig. 1) corresponds to the ordered thresh-
olds. For peripheral failures (Fig. 1), nodes with de-
gree k are equipped with threshold values in the inter-
val ]Φ−1 (F (k)) ,Φ−1 (F (k − 1))]. For central failures,
we have ]Φ−1 (1− F (k − 1)) ,Φ−1 (1− F (k))]. Conse-
quently, Eq. (1) simplifies for peripheral failures to
FΘ(pf)(k)(x) =
| ]F (k − 1), F (k)]∩]0,Φ (x)] |
| ]F (k − 1), F (k)] |
=
min {F (k),Φ (x)} − F (k − 1)
p(k)
1{Φ(x)>F (k−1)}(k),
(3)
where 1 denotes the indicator function that is defined
for any set M as 1M(x) = 1 if x ∈ M and 1M(x) = 0
for x /∈ M. Formally, this formula measures the over-
lap between the intervals ]F (k − 1), F (k)] and ]0,Φ (x)],
divided by the width | ]F (k − 1), F (k)] | = p(k) to nor-
malize the cdf. The same idea applies also to central
failures, however, in this case the fraction of nodes are
ordered decreasingly. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the posi-
tion of nodes in the interval corresponds to the probabil-
ity mass 1 − Φ(x). Thus, nodes with a threshold bigger
or equal to x correspond to the interval [0, 1 − Φ(x)],
FIG. 2. Illustration of the threshold assignment for central
failures analogously to Fig. 1.
3while nodes with threshold smaller or equal to x belong
to [1− Φ(x), 1]. To calculate the fraction of failed nodes
with a threshold smaller or equal to x within the fraction
of nodes with degree k, we have to estimate the overlap
between the intervals [1− Φ(x), 1] and ]F (k − 1), F (k)]:
FΘ(cf)(k)(x) =
| ]F (k − 1), F (k)]∩]1− Φ (x) , 1] |
| ]F (k − 1), F (k)] |
=
F (k)−max {F (k − 1), 1− Φ (x)}
p(k)
1{F (k)>1−Φ(x)}(k).
(4)
To know the threshold distributions is necessary to
compute average quantities in infinitely large random
networks. The cascade size, i.e. the fraction of failed
nodes ρ(t) = 1/N
∑
i si(t), is of particular interest as a
measure of network robustness or systemic risk. We can
express it as ρ(t) =
∑
k p(k)
∫
pΛ(t)(λ)FΘ(k)(λ) dλ for
N → ∞ [28]. This form simplifies for models where the
load only depends on the number of failed neighbors m
of a node. The term FΘ(k)(λ) then refers to the response
function Fk,m in Ref. [17]. In general, the iterative up-
date of the load distribution pΛ(t) in time follows from
the specific cascade model, for instance as in [12, 28, 29],
and can also depend on multiplex network structures [13].
To elucidate our approach, we use two well studied and
generic models that have been termed exposure diversi-
fication (ED) and damage diversification (DD). The ED
model, introduced in [8], was applied to different fields,
including opinion formation [30] and Finance [19, 31]. It
is based on the idea that a node simply carries the frac-
tion of its failed neighbors as load. Thus, the failure of
hubs usually has devastating consequences, as it impacts
many nodes. The cascade size can be reduced by protect-
ing nodes with higher degree, by assigning them higher
thresholds (pf) without changing the overall threshold
distribution. The DD model is a cascade model variant
[16], where each failing node j spreads the load 1/kj to
each of its neighbors. Hence, the load that single neigh-
bors receive from a failing hub is rather small. Thus, the
negative impact of failing hubs is counteracted. The cas-
cade size can be reduced by protecting nodes with smaller
degree, i.e by assigning them higher thresholds (cf).
In the following, we explore different combinations of
the two cascade models (ED, DD) and the two threshold
allocation strategies (cf, pf). We use a standard set-up
[12, 28], i.e. we calculate average cascade sizes on ran-
dom graphs ensembles with Poisson degree distribution
p(k) ∼ λk/k! or on scale free networks with p(k) ∼ k−3,
both with average degree z =
∑
k p(k)k = 3. Further, we
assume normally distributed thresholds Φ ∼ N (µ, σ2) to
test the influence of mean node robustness µ and hetero-
geneity σ. Our analytic results are compared with Monte
Carlo simulations (see Fig. 3 for details). We note that
our calculations based on the analytic derivations per-
fectly match the simulation results, even at the first order
phase transition.
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FIG. 3. Comparison of the average final cascade size ρ ob-
tained from numerical analytic calculations and simulations,
where lines represent the former and symbols in the same color
correspond to the latter. Numerically, we consider T = 50
cascade time steps. In simulations, we realize 100 indepen-
dent networks of size N = 105 by the configuration model
and draw independently N normally distributed thresholds
with mean µ and standard deviation σ (Φ ∼ N (µ, σ2)) that
are assigned to nodes according to pf or cf strategies. (a) Pf:
Results for scale free networks and σ = 0.5 are depicted in
in light blue triangles for the ED model and in red x for the
DD model. Poisson random graphs and σ = 0.2 correspond
to black circles for ED and to dark blue plus signs + for DD.
(b) As in (a), but for cf.
To discuss the results in detail, we use for compari-
son the case of uncorrelated thresholds and degrees [12].
In this reference set-up, the DD model usually leads to
smaller average cascades ρ than the ED model. Intro-
ducing correlations between threshold and degrees, we
can confirm this finding for negative correlations, i.e. for
the cf attack scheme (the higher the degree the lower
the threshold). However, if we choose positive correla-
tions between threshold and degrees (pf), the ED model
on average leads to smaller cascades than the DD model.
Hence, positive correlations can significantly improve the
robustness of the ED network.
Secondly, we compare the robustness for different net-
work topologies and find that, in comparison to Poisson
random graphs, scale free networks are more robust, even
for attack combinations as DD/pf and ED/cf in a region
of small µ. This is interesting because so far mostly the
opposite case, namely the increase of systemic risk be-
cause of the presence of hubs, has been discussed. The
cf attack scenario reflects that hubs have a high failure
risk. However, their better risk diversification, expressed
by the large number of neighbors, supports the system
robustness.
This finding is related to the robust-yet-fragile property
that scale free networks exhibit with respect to percola-
tion [3]. We observe a similar phenomenon for ED cas-
cades, interestingly for both topologies, not only for scale
free networks. Even more, attacks can lead to larger
cascades than in case of uncorrelated threshold alloca-
tions. But this conclusion does not apply to DD models,
i.e. it strongly depends on the dynamics of the cascade.
Further, it is also sensitive to the parameters µ and σ
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FIG. 4. Phase diagram for the fraction of failed nodes ρ with thresholds distributed according to the order statistics obtained
from a normal distribution N (µ, σ2) on scale free random graphs with average degree z = 3. (a) ED with pf, and (c) DD with
cf. The middle panel (b) shows their difference ρ(a) − ρ(b). The inner graphic of (a) shows a snippet of (a) for µ = 0.17 and
varying σ, where the black curve belongs to numeric results and the red circles to simulations.
characterizing the threshold distribution. In some cases,
even the combination DD/cf that is usually most robust
can lead to the largest cascades. Still, the combination
DD/cf is able to reduce the largest average cascades for
both topologies. Hence, it can be considered as the most
promising diversification strategy for increasing systemic
risk.
To shed more light on the nontrivial dependence be-
tween dynamic processes on networks (ED/DD) and at-
tack strategies (cf/pf), we compare the phase diagram
for the combination DD/cf with the combination ED/pf,
which is also a risk reducing strategy. Fig. 4 shows the
results for scale free networks. Two remarkable facts are
immediately apparent. First, the phase transition for
ED/pf in Fig. 4(a) is of irregular shape. Usually, in-
creasing the threshold heterogeneity σ leads to a sudden
increase of ρ followed by a slow continuous decrease. Yet,
for ED/pf, ρ can jump several times for small changes of
σ. The presence of positive correlations between thresh-
olds and degrees (pf) changes even the qualitative nature
of the ED phase diagram. Our simulations confirm that
these observations cannot be attributed to (hypothetical)
numerical instabilities when calculating our approxima-
tions. Second, none of the two studied variants, ED/pf
and DD/cf, outperforms the other for all threshold pa-
rameters, as depicted in Fig. 4 (b). While ED/pf leads
to the smallest average cascades for most threshold pa-
rameters, DD/cf reduces the severity of cascades in the
region of big cascades.
Hence, in order to reduce systemic risk, system de-
signers are confronted with two feasible options: ED/pf
or DD/cf. It is left to them to decide whether they prefer
to minimize the average cascade size for most threshold
parameters or to reduce the parameter space where the
system breaks-down completely. One objective excludes
the other, but both cases lead to a very different outcome
with respect to the surviving nodes. Fig. 5 shows clearly
that for the ED/pf combination nodes of almost every
degree survive a cascade, while in the DD/cf only nodes
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FIG. 5. Fraction of failed nodes P (s(t) = 1; k) with degree
k ≤ 10 in Poisson random graphs, which fail at the time indi-
cated by the color of the bar. Gray corresponds to fractions
of nodes that remain functional. Φ ∼ N (0.2, 0.32). (a) ED
pf. (b) DD cf.
with small degree stay functional. In consequence, the
remaining overall connectivity is much lower for DD/cf.
This may have implications for the functionality of the
overall system. One could argue that an optimal allo-
cation of thresholds can be solved as control problem.
Yet, our findings suggest that already small changes in
the studied parameters could demand a converse con-
trol strategy. Thus, parameter uncertainty could hinder
robust control. Another important aspect for dynamic
controls is the different speed of failure amplification, as
apparent from Fig. 5 In the ED/pf cases, cascades tend to
evolve much slower than in the DD/cf case, which leaves
more time for interventions that could hinder cascades to
grow larger.
In summary, we have highlighted several aspects that
become relevant for cascade control based on a threshold
allocation for nodes. Most importantly, we have shown
that correlations between thresholds and degrees change
considerably the occurrence of phase transitions and the
overall cascade profile. Such correlations naturally oc-
cur in engineered or self-organizing systems, hence they
5need to be included in any robustness analysis. To fa-
cilitate this, we have provided an analytic description in
heterogeneous mean field or local tree approximations,
respectively, which becomes exact in the thermodynamic
limit of infinite networks size.
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